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1   Antonio GAROFALO





How many hours per week should workers in the United States and Germany 
spend at their paying jobs? The present paper addresses this question by 
constructing policymakers’ reaction functions capable of modelling the 
optimal length of working time as a function of the relevant labour market 
variables. The empirical analysis is based on the optimal control algorithm. 
Given a policymaker’s loss function and a structural model of the labour 
market we define alternative specifications of reaction functions where the 
response coefficients indicate how policymakers should react to any news in 
the labour market in order to stabilize employment and wages. We also 
perform a comparative analysis on the ability of the rules to correspond to 
historical working-time records. The results suggest that simple rules perform 
quite well and that the advantages obtained from adopting an optimal control-
based rule are not so great. Moreover, the analysis emphasizes the success 
of the wage-based rule and of the employment-based rule in the US and 
Germany, respectively. Finally, we propose a policy rule to capture the 
dynamics of the weekly working hours. According to our rule the length of the 
workweek is an inverse function of the deviation between the actual and 
potential employment level. 
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Introduction 
The study analyzes the performances of different reaction functions to be used as possible 
guidelines for the setting of weekly working hours. The reaction function, summarizing how 
policymakers should alter their policy in response to economic development, can be useful in 
assessing the current stance, as well as the future direction, of labour market policy.  
The question of rules versus discretion has generated a great deal of debate in many areas 
of the social sciences. The recent past has increasingly been characterized by a massive 
presence of rules in the proceedings of economic policies. Examples in such a direction are 
for all to see; to quote some: “The Stability and Growth Pact”, Maastricht convergence 
criteria, ECB strategies, inflation targeting strategies and so on.  
In his pioneering work Tinbergen (1952) suggested that the specification of the objects of a 
certain policy represented by a social welfare function to be maximized by the economic 
authorities needs the identification of the instruments able to achieve such objectives
4. The 
solution of this optimization problem results in a policy reaction function. In order to evaluate 
the various results a policymaker obtains from adopting a particular rule, a preliminary 
definition of what constitutes rule-based labour market policy in practice must be given. As 
no policymaker will be bound to the prescription of any simple rule (or any optimal control 
algorithm), the distinction between rule-based and discretionary labour market policy is 
crucial. In particular, while a discretionary policy takes into account current macroeconomic 
conditions, ignoring past development in the economic system, a rule-based policy is based 
on a "timeless perspective", i.e. the rule is constructed as if the current conditions were not 
known. According to this definition, when following a discretionary policy, the policymakers 
re-optimizes its decision-making process periodically, while in a rule-based policy, labour 
market authorities implement a contingency formula chosen to be applied for an infinite 
number of time periods. Nevertheless, in the rule-based framework, the possibility of revising 
a rule is also contemplated, once the policymaker gets new information on the state of the 
economy. Any binding rule is, of course, a constraint on behaviour. Hence the question, why 
should policymakers deliberately choose to impose constraints on his own freedom of 
action? 
                                                 
4 See Sachs and Larrain (1995) for more details.   5
The reason why a policymaker should adopt a policy rule, instead of having a discretionary 
behaviour, has a theoretical basis in time-consistency literature of monetary policy. In this 
literature, to which the seminal contribution was made by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and 
Barro and Gordon (1983), it is shown that if a central bank does not commit itself to a rule, 
the policymakers will be tempted to choose a suboptimal inflation policy. The contribution of 
Barro and Gordon is of particular interest for the issues analyzed in the paper because the 
"rules vs. discretion" dichotomy is separated from the debate on "activist vs. non-activist" 
central bank policy. This separation has resulted in the possibility for monetary policymaking 
to concentrate on the issue of policy rules.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 presents some empirical 
evidence on the determinants of workweek length in Germany and the US. Section 2 reports 
a theoretical model designed to summarize the main channels through which policymakers 
might affect employment and wages. Section 3 introduces a set of instrument rule retrieved 
by using a quadratic loss function over some policy targets. Moreover, the section focuses 
on the historical analysis of policy rules as well as on the efficiency of the estimated working-
time policy rules. In Section 4, we propose a rule that captures the historical pattern of the 
weekly hours. Section 5 ends the paper with concluding remarks. 
1. The Determinants of Workweek Length 
In recent years, and indeed over the twentieth century in general, recorded yearly average 
number of hours worked per employee sharply declined in most countries of the 
industrialised world; the long-term decline in average annual hours has slowed down in 
almost all OECD countries, with trends even occasionally reversed. In addition, usual 
European working hours are shorter with respect to countries such as Japan or the US. 
Various elements affect hours worked across OECD countries, relating to matters (Bishop, 
2004) such as regulations and legislation, preferences and culture, wages, tax rates, 
business cycle effects and structural changes in the economy. 
As regards regulations and legislation, countries may be classified in three groups (Bollé, 
2001): a first group, encompassing the UK and Ireland, where there is individual flexibility 
between employers and workers; a second with countries such as France, Spain and 
Finland where state-driven flexibility is under way, and finally negotiated flexibility is the rule   6
in countries such as Denmark, the Netherlands and Germany. Although the 93/104/EC 
Directive states the maximum working week duration is 48 hours throughout EU countries, 
national systems operate in the direction of imposing shorter hours (such as France, 
Denmark, Sweden and the UK) or sometimes longer hours
5. Wage levels, nonetheless, may 
affect the level of hours worked although in this case income and substitution effects operate 
concerning the choice between consumption and leisure. In an interesting paper Prescott 
(2004) addresses the importance of the tax rate in the allocation between market and non-
market activities; to this extent Prescott (2004) in dealing with the question as to why 
Americans work much more than Europeans, underlines the role played by taxes in 
accounting for the differences in labour supply across countries and times although 
Schettkat (2003) suggests that once time in household production is included the differences 
disappear. In addition none can neglect that labour market variables are influenced by 
movements in the business cycle; as a consequence, we observe that total hours growth is 
positive in expansion and negative in recession. Finally, but not least, the change in the 
structure of the economy may deeply influence working hours. Most countries of the Western 
world have repeated the “revolution” begun in England, i.e. the transition from an agricultural 
to an industrial economy; this process although advanced furthest in the US is found in 
practice in all developed countries. Nowadays almost all highly industrialised countries have 
become “service economies” if we look at them in terms of the share of workers employed in 
service industries (Schettkat and Yocarini, 2003)
6. As a consequence it comes as no 
surprise that patterns in working time tend to be more flexible with varied working hours 
since service-based economies tend to be more flexible than industrial economies.   
If we turn our attention to data we observe that hours worked in the US are much longer than 
those typically worked in European countries. To this extent it is useful to have a look at 
Figure 1 where average weekly hours worked in manufacturing (unadjusted data) are 






                                                 
5 For more details in this direction see EIRO (2004) “Working time-developments in EU and national regulation”, 
available at www.eiro.eurofound.ie . 
6 An accurate analysis on the causes of the shift to the services economy is contained in Schettkat and Yocarini 
(2003).    7























































































































































Inspection of Figure 1 suggests that roughly during the first decade (1976-1986) German 
workers used to work longer weekly hours than their US counterparts while from the mid-80s 
onwards a substantial decrease in hours worked in Germany (determining an overall 
negative trend for the period considered) and an increase for the US ones (positive trend) is 
observed. Although, as stated, Prescott (2004) underlines the role played by tax rates on 
labour income, interestingly once we shift our attention to non-agricultural activities
7 the story 
reverts in the sense that the weekly working week duration for the US turns being lower than 
the corresponding German one with values running from 35.8 and 40.9 (respectively US and 
Germany – 1977:01) to 33.8 and 37.1 (2004.01). If in addition we recall that industrialised 
economies are, in fact, service economies it comes as no surprise that if a rule governing 
working time behaviour should be found in order to minimise employment loss, this has to be 
dealt with by considering non-agricultural activities rather than mainly manufacturing since 
the former encompasses the higher share of employment.      
                                                 
7 Belong to this sector (ILO definitions): Mining and quarrying; manufacturing, gas and water; construction; wholesale 
and retail trade, restaurants and hotels; transport, storage and communication; financing, insurance, real estate and 
business services; community, social and personal services; activities not adequately defined.    8
2. A Structural Model of Labour Market Dynamics 
The model used in the analysis is a backward-looking, closed-economy model. The 
specification of equations is thought to be representative of the main effects that 
policymakers might have on employment and wages. 






t ti t j j t
i
ww n u αα ++ − + +
=
= ∑ ++     [1] 
This equation relates the growth rate of real hourly wages (w), i.e. 
() ( ) 44 100 log log 100 log log tt t t WW C P IC P I −− ×− − × −        where W is the nominal wage and 
CPI is the consumer price index, to its own lags and to a lagged employment gap (% n ), 
measured as a percent gap between the actual employment level and the potential 
employment
8. The specification of labour supply is consistent with an adaptive 
representation of wage expectations. The expectations are treated implicitly by the inclusion 
of lagged values of the variables. 
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According to the above equation, the employment gap is related to the output gap (% y ), the 
variation of hourly wages (w), the growth rate of weekly hours and to its own lags. This 
specification implies that working hours (h) are an exogenous variable under the complete 
control of policymakers.  




t tt t yy y u δδ + +− =+ +     [3] 
This specification is chosen for simplicity. Additional variables can be incorporated in the 
above equation without causing any difficulties.  
The timing of the model can be summarized as follows: an increase in weekly working hours 
t h  in period t affects employment with one period lag; it takes another period, i.e. at time 
2 t + , for employment to affect wages.    9
The model was estimated by applying the SURE technique
9. The data are quarterly and are 
taken from the ILO statistics
10. The sample period goes from 1975:1 to 2004:1. All variables 
were de-meaned prior to estimation. The estimated equations are (standard errors are 
reported in brackets):  
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For our purposes, the key coefficients in the tables are the 1 k β + 's, which represent the effect 
of the weekly hours on employment gap; the coefficients on the lagged labour supply curve 
that represent the inertia of the wage process, i.e.  h α 's; and  1 j α +  which measures the effect 
of an increase in the employment gap on the wage rate, i.e. the slope of the labour supply. 
At first glance, the model seems to perform rather well. Almost all coefficients are significant 
at the 5% level. The parameter  1 k β +  ranges from -0.12 in United States to -0.15 in Germany. 
On average, a one-point increase in the weekly hours reduces the employment gap by 
                                                                                                                                           
8 Potential employment as well as potential output was computed by using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter. As we 
have quarterly data, we set the smoothing parameter to 1600. 
9 The order of the autoregressive coefficients in equation (1) and equation (2) is tested for both countries by 
implementing standard test statistics. We computed the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), Schwarz Bayesian 
Criterion (SBC), Hannan-Quinn, and FPE for both equations. The criteria do not give completely coherent results, 
but the choice of using a fourth order autoregressive structure is the most appropriate. AIC and HQ suggest a 
maximum lag equal to four, whereas the Schwarz criterion recommends adding only one and two autoregressive 
components per variable for the United States and Germany, respectively. As stressed in Reimers (1993), HQ 
should be preferred among these criteria. We then fix the number of lags at four for both countries. 
10See Appendix 1 for the details on the variables used in the empirical analysis. 
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almost 13 basis points. Concerning the effects of the employment gap on wages, the 
estimated coefficients vary from 0.13 in Germany to 0.18 in the United States. 
3. Working-Time Policy Rules 
The class of rules considered in the analysis are instrument rules retrieved by using a 
quadratic loss function over some policy targets. In particular, the labour market authorities 
are assigned to minimize an intertemporal loss function that increases if there is a deviation 
between a target variable and the target level for this variable. 
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 ∑     [4] 
where  t E  refers to expectations conditional upon the available information set at time t, 
while ϑ is a given discount factor, with 01 ϑ << . 
The above expression describes a flexible wage target where the goal variables describing 
central bank preferences are  t w , i.e. the deviation of actual wages growth from a constant, 
given wage target;  t n , i.e. the employment gap and  1 tt hh − − , a weekly hours smoothing 
term. Moreover, λ , ϕ  and γ  are non-negative weights that the government attaches to 
stabilize wages, employment and weekly hours, respectively. If ϕ  and γ  are set at zero, we 
are in a situation of strict wage-targeting.  
Concerning the variables that enter into the loss function it is worth noting that, from a 
practical point of view, the difficulty in measuring the employment gap and public familiarity 
with the concept of wages supports the choice of wages for policymakers communication 
and econometrics estimation purposes, respectively. Nevertheless, employment stabilization 
is also important to labour market authorities. Finally, the inclusion of the objective of weekly 
hours rate smoothing is proposed to account for the aversion that policymakers have to 
frequently changing the direction of their strategy. 
It is possible to show that for  1 ϑ =  the optimization problem can be rewritten interpreting 
the intertemporal loss function as the unconditional mean of the period loss function; this 
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means that the intertemporal loss function can be written as the weighted sum of the 
unconditional variances of goal variables: 
[ ] [ ] % [ ] 1 t tt t t E L Var w Var n Var h h λϕ γ −  =++ −      [5] 
In the following, this loss function will be used, assuming, therefore, the limiting case 1. 
3.1 State-Space Representation 
The State space representation of the estimated model is: 
11 tt t t X AX Bh v ++ =+ +     [6] 
This compact form summarizes the structure underlined by the dynamic model. More 
precisely, in the above equation the 13 1 ×  vector  X  contains the state variables, the 
13 13 ×  matrix A and the 13 1 ×  column vector B contains the estimated parameters, and the 
13 1 ×  column vector  t v  is the disturbance term. This representation summarizes the 
dynamic structure of the economy and the uncertainty that the government faces regarding 
this structure. The matrix A and the vector B govern the dynamics of the state vector. 
Uncertainty enters through the additive stochastic vector  1 t v + . The terms in equation (6) can 























































































Where  i e  denotes a  () 15 kj ×+ + row vector with all elements equal to zero and with the 
elements  1,....... 4 ik j =+ +  equal to unity. Note that all variables entering the state-space 
representation are expressed as a function of lagged data only. This condition comes from 
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The loss function can now be expressed as: 
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The class of linear feedback rules considered here takes the following generic form:  
tt hf X =     [7] 
where f  denotes a 1( 5 ) kj ×+ + vector. Using the foregoing relations, the dynamics of the  14
model follow: 
11 , tt t X MX v M A Bf ++ =+ = +  
, tt X i YC X CC C f == +  
The optimal linear feedback rule is an instrument rule that, given the economic structure 
implied by the rule, is able to minimize the labour market authorities loss function. Thus, the 
optimal linear feedback rule can be expressed as:  
() ( )
1
t f R BV B U BV A X
− ′′ ′ =− + +  
 where the matrix V satisfies the Riccati equation: 
V Q U f fU fR f MV M ′′ ′ ′ =+ + + +  
 and where: 
, a n d   XX Xi ii Q C KC U C KC R C KC
′′ ′ == =  
In this section, different specifications of instrument rules will be estimated. Within this class 
of rule, the policymakers’ instrument is expressed as a function of the available information. 
The analysis considers six instrument rules. The first is the unrestricted optimal control rule: 
tt hf X =  
where f denotes a 1( 5 ) kj ×+ + vector of response coefficients. In this case, government 
responds to changes in every state variable. 
The second rule is the Wage-Employment-Output rule. This rule (henceforth WEOR), 
assumes that weekly hours are a function of the current values of output, employment and 
wages: 
% %
t tn w ty t hf nf wf y =++ 
where  n f ,  w f  and y f  are the response coefficients of employment, wages and the output 
gap respectively. 
By setting the coefficient on the output gap at zero we obtain the third rule, i.e. the Wage-
Employment rule (WER): 
%
t tw tn hf wf n =+  
The fourth and fifth rules are pure wage rules (WR) and pure employment rules (ER) of the 
form:  15
tw t hf w =   and    %
t tn hf n =  
Finally the sixth rule is a forward-looking rule (FLR). Specifically, the policymakers are 




tt t tw n h t hf w f nf h + − =+ +  
where  8
e
tt w +  is the 8-quarter ahead wages forecast for a given amount of weekly working 




tt ht t we A X B h + =+  
The forecasts are also computed conditional upon the current state variables t X
11. 
Figure 2 shows, for both countries, the forecast used to compute the forward-looking rule 
together with the actual growth rate of hourly wages. As shown in figure 2, the forecasts 
appear to capture the dynamic of the wages. 
Table 1 presents the estimated response coefficients of the selected policy rules. In 
principle, there are several factors affecting the particular specification of the rule that a 
policymaker can follow. In fact, different values of the state variable, X, different impacts of 
labour policy, A and B, and different government preferences over employment and wages, 
K, may result in a different weekly hours policy, i.e. a different rule. The differences in the 















                                                 
11This means that the restrictions on  f are: 
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Figure 2: Wage Forecast (dashed) vs. Actual Hourly Wages (solid) 
Germany















Table 1:  Estimated Response Coefficients for the six Policy Rules 
DE USA DE USA DE USA DE USA DE USA DE USA
---------- -0.54 -0.42
-0.44 -0.3 -0.44 -0.34 -0.46 -0.37 -0.34 -0.43 ----
-0.13 -0.21 ---- -0.11 -0.3 ----
-0.1 -0.12 ---- -0.09 -0.16 ----
-0.07 -0.08 ---- -0.08 -0.1 -- -1.21 -1.144
-0.93 -1.29 -0.83 -1.05 -0.87 -1.15 0 0 -0.91 -1.26 - -
0.33 1.1 ------ -0.32 -0.24 - -
0.05 -0.52 ------ -0.05 -0.15 - -
0.03 0.25 ------ -0.03 -0.09 - -
-0.23 -0.06 -0.25 -0.12 --------
-0.05 -0.01 ----------
h t 0.53 0.52 ----------
h t-1 -0.11 -0.1 ----------
h t-2 0.02 0.04 ----------





1 t w −
2 t w −
3 t w −
t n
1 t n −
2 t n −
3 t n −
t y
1 t y −
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The table gives some interesting results. Consistent with a priori beliefs, the first weekly-
hours smoothing coefficients are quite high, 0.52 on average, while the third and fourth lag 
coefficients are much lower. 
Table 1 also suggests that Germany is the country where a rise in expected wages produces 
the larger response from the policymakers in terms of weekly-hours reaction; an increase of 
one percent induces the labour market authorities to decrease the weekly-hours growth rates 
by 45 basis points on average.  
Another interesting result regards the employment gap estimated coefficients. In both  17
countries, a rise in the employment gap induces policymakers to decrease weekly hours. 
According to the optimal feedback rule, a one-percent increase in the employment gap in 
Germany, for example, should induce the policymakers to decrease the weekly hours by 
almost 100 basis points on the average. However, the estimated response to a change in the 
employment gap is higher in the US than in Germany.  
We can conclude that the trade union presence mainly affects the level of hours worked, as 
trade unions encourage the adjustment of hours, rather than employment, in order to protect 
the insider power of existing workers. In the US, where there is higher flexibility, firms are 
more likely to adjust employment rather than hours worked. 
3.2 The Historical Functioning of Working-hours 
This section focuses on the historical analysis of weekly-hours policy rules. Analysis of the 
historical behaviour of the working-time can give useful insights for the conduct of labour 
market policy.  
In particular, the section analyzes the differences between the estimated policy action and 
the rule the policymakers have been using during the past decades. The deviation of the 
actual policy rules, summarized by the standard-weekly hours, from the estimated rules 
might be considered a ''policy mistake''. We can then assess whether the value of the weekly 
hours implied by the six policy rules considered in the previous section are significantly 
different from actual policymakers’ behaviour. 
Figures 3 and 4 show, for Germany and the US, the growth rate of the weekly hours of work 











Figure 3: Estimated Rules (dashed lines) vs. Actual Hours (solid lines) in Germany  
 
Optimal feedback Rule













































Figure 4: Estimated Rules (dashed lines) vs. Actual Hours (solid lines) in the US 
 
Optimal feedback Rule









































From this analysis, it is clear that all the rules perform quite well in replicating historical 
working hours’ movements. The forward-looking rule successfully describes the historical 
behaviour of working hours. The possibility for policymakers to respond to forecasts about 
future wages is then to be considered as a realistic feature of policy-making.  
The figures also capture the sources of the deviations of the rules from the historical records. 
Looking at figure 4, for example, we can see that at the beginning of the sample, there was a  20
sharp increase in wage growth. This reflects the high response of policymakers for these 
periods when using rules that react to wages, i.e. WR, WER and WEOR. However, if, during 
the same periods, the policymakers had followed the employment rule, they would not have 
changed the working hours so much.   
The same consideration applies to the German case concerning the reaction to employment 
gap changes. The employment rule fails to capture the historical records of weekly hours 
during the German unification years (1990-92). This is mainly because at the time of 
unification between West and East Germany there was a huge change in the employment 
level. This results in a higher deviation of the rule from the historical weekly hours when 
policymakers follow the employment rule.      
The ability of the optimal feedback-rule (OFR) to reproduce the historical weekly hours is 
shown in Figures 5. The figures also show the estimated policy mistakes. The two series of 
policy mistakes are obtained by subtracting the estimated values of the optimal feedback 
rule from the historical values of the weekly hours. A positive value in the figure indicates 
that for that period the number of weekly hours actually worked was higher than the number 
of hours the policymakers should have fixed in order to stabilize the labour market. The 
vertical axis shows the deviation of the historical weekly hours from the estimated rule. 
 
Figure 5: OFR (dashed lines) vs. Actual Hours (solid lines) and the Policy Mistakes 
US - Optimal feedback Rule





US - Policy Mistakes





DE - Optimal feedback Rule





DE - Policy Mistakes








Consistently across countries, we can characterize three periods of labour market policy 
history.   21
In the first period, covering the early 1980s, historical weekly hours appear to be well above 
the estimated policy rules. This suggests that the number of weekly hours implemented by 
the policymakers of the two countries was too high. Specifically, the number of hours that 
exceeded the optimal level implied by the dynamic control algorithm were 1.5 and 0.9 for the 
US and Germany, respectively. 
The second period, occurring in the early 1990s, embraces the European monetary system 
crises. In this period, the behaviour of the labour market authorities in the two countries was 
quite dissimilar. The differences basically derive from the different economic situation the two 
countries faced in that period. Indeed, the OFR replicates well the dynamics of the weekly 
hours in the US but fails to do so for Germany. The reason is that in the early 1990s the 
unification of East and West Germany together with the ERM crises produced a recessionary 
effect on the German economy. In order to stabilize the labour market, Germany should 
have reduced the number of weekly hours.  
The third period goes from the mid 1990s to the end of the sample. In this period, the 
outcome of the estimated rules in the US appears to be much closer to the historical weekly 
hours. Although the OFR suggests an increase in the number of weekly hours, the changes 
in the hours of work in the late 1990s were estimated to be about the right magnitude.  
Also in Germany, apart from 2001, the OFR suggests a rise in the length of the workweek. 
However, the deviation, and then the policy mistake, is much larger. Accordingly, Germany 
should increase the number of weekly hours by almost 3.5%.    
We can conclude that, over the last two decades, macroeconomic performance has 
improved markedly in the US rather than in Germany. Better macroeconomic performance 
has not only resulted in a higher employment gap: it has also improved the stability of the 
wages and the employment. On the contrary, German labour market authorities have not 
met their stabilization objectives. 
3.3. The Efficiency of the Working-time Policy Rules 
This section analyzes the efficiency of the estimated rules. An efficiency analysis of 
alternative policy rules cannot solely rely on the differences between actual and estimated 
reaction functions. In fact, a policy rule has to be considered optimal if it minimizes a 
weighted sum, where the weights are set by the tastes of policymakers, of employment 
variance and wages variance. In our case, given the specification of the loss function in  22
equation [4], a term in weekly hours smoothing is also taken into account. In other words, the 
efficiency of a rule results from its ability to stabilize employment, wages and working hours 
changes around their target values for an infinite number of periods. 
The unconditional variances of employment, wages and weekly hours rate are calculated 
using the method developed in Rudebush (spelt differently in references) and Svensson 
(1998). More precisely, the 33 ×  covariance matrix of the goal variables is given by: 
tt YY XX E YY C C
′′  ≡=  ∑∑  
where the (3 ) (3 ) kh kh ++ × ++  matrix  XX ∑  represents the unconditional covariance 
matrix of the state variables and satisfies the following relationship:  
tt XX XX vv EX X M M
′′  ≡= +  ∑∑ ∑  
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Finally we can solve for  () XX ∑  :  
() () ()
1
XX vv vec I M M vec
−
=− ⊗   ∑∑  
Table 2 provides the results for the volatility of goal variables, measured as the unconditional 
variances, implied by the six estimated rules under the hypothesis that  0.4 λ = ,  0.4 ϕ =  
and 0.2 γ = . With this assumption, the analysis is implicitly carried out under the hypothesis 
that, for the policymakers, the volatility of employment and wages is equally undesirable 
() λϕ =  while the variability of weekly-working hours is much less costly  () 0.2 γ = . These 
tables also report the loss implied by the rules and the relative ranking in terms of loss in the 
fourth and fifth columns of Table 2, respectively.  
 
                                                 
12The relationships used are:  vec A  Bvec A  vec B   and  
vec ABCvec C

 A  vec B . 
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Table 2: Results of Employment and Wage Volatility 
S.D.(w) S.D.(ñ) S.D.(h) Loss Rank
Optimal Feedback rule 0.78 1.17 0.79 1.12 1
Wage-Employment-Output rule 1.87 1.20 0.74 2.57 5
Wage-Employment rule 1.57 1.22 0.52 2.04 4
Wage rule 0.47 3.43 0.10 6.01 6
Employment rule 1.60 0.75 0.12 1.56 2
Forward-looking rule 1.77 0.95 0.09 2.01 3
Optimal Feedback rule 0.90 0.87 1.10 1.03 1
Wage-Employment-Output rule 4.03 3.50 1.32 14.58 5
Wage-Employment rule 3.99 3.88 1.02 15.71 6
Wage rule 0.84 1.54 1.43 1.95 2
Employment rule 2.41 0.61 0.11 3.09 3





In both countries, the variability of optimal feedback rules outperforms, in terms of minimum 
losses, the other rules. This means that the volatility of the goal variables is minimized once 
the policymakers adopt an optimal feedback rule.  
The employment rule and the wage rule are the second top-performing rule in the US and 
Germany, respectively; the results in terms of the volatility of target variables and, therefore, 
in terms of losses are very close to those of the optimal feedback rule. However, the 
performance of the WR in Germany is very poor. 
The forward-looking rule outperforms both the WER and WEOR. It follows that the inclusion 
of a forward-looking dimension in a labour market authorities’ decision process seems to 
improve the performance of the simple rule. 
From the comparative analysis we can conclude that the pure employment rule is able to 
stabilize labour market variables almost as well as the OFR. 
To augment the tables, Figure 6 shows the efficiency frontiers of each rule in Germany and 
the US. These curves illustrate the trade-off between employment gap variability and wage 
variability. They are obtained by varying the weight on wages from 0.01 to 0.8 and assuming 
0.2 γ =  . The weight on wage stabilization implicitly determines the weight on employment 
stabilization since  is set equal to 1 λ − . Thus, as the weight on wages stabilization is 
increased by 0.01, the weight on employment stabilization is reduced by the same amount at  24
each step. As λ  increases, the rules correspond to points further to the right on the curve. 
The trade-off resulting from the optimal rule is shown as a solid line. The dashed lines show 
the rule indicated in the caption. The efficiency frontiers basically confirm the results of the 
tables. Moreover, they provide the following insights. First, the performances of the rules 
seem to be very close to one another even though the performances of the optimal and the 
employment rules are the best. This is particularly true for Germany, as in the US the 
efficiency frontier of the wage rule is lower than that estimated for the employment rule. 
The figure confirms the success of the US strategy in stabilizing wages and employment 
during the sample period. The results also highlight the poor performance of Germany when 
following the wage rule. Consistently with the previous analysis, the results show the poor 
performance of WEOR and WER. A closer performance of these rules in both countries was 
then expected.  
Altogether, these results support the choice of employment rule as a role framework in 

















































































































































































































4. Searching for Working time regularities: A Guideline 
rule  
Based on the estimated results we propose a rule to capture the historical pattern of the 
weekly hours. A proposal should be based not only on the ability of the rule to give a better 
representation of the historical weekly hours dynamic, but also on the efficiency of the rules, 
measured in terms of volatility. 
According to our rule, the growth rate of the hours of work increases when the employment  26
level is lower than its potential level, i.e. 
* () tt dh n n =− − . The reason why we select this 
rule is that we believe that labour market variables are affected by movements in the 
business cycle.  
As we can observe from figure 7, the rule replicates the historical records quite well. In 
particular, according to the proposed rule the growth in total hours is positive when there is a 
negative deviation of the actual employment level to the potential employment level, i.e. 
when we are in expansion. On the contrary, during recessionary periods, where the potential 
level of employment is most likely to exceed its actual level we observe a decrease in the 
weekly hours. 
 
Figure 7: Actual Hours (solid) vs. Proposed Rule (dashed) 
US - Proposed Rule





DE - Proposed Rule







This result of the previous sections suggests that by using a rule that concentrates on the 
employment gap not only do we obtain a good approximation of the historical pattern, but 
policymakers also minimise the volatility of real wages and the employment gap. 
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5. Concluding Remarks 
This paper attempts to analyze the performance of different rules capable of modelling how 
the labour market authorities of Germany and the US have made policy decisions affecting 
weekly working hours. In particular, the study focuses on six different rules relating the hours 
of work, which the policymakers are assumed to control, to a set of variables thought to 
affect labour market authority behaviour.  
The set of rules includes an optimal feedback rule, a wage-employment-output rule, a wage-
employment rule, a wage rule, an employment rule and a forward-looking rule. All the rules 
are calculated from an intertemporal optimization problem of a loss function penalizing the 
volatility of employment gap, real wages and weekly hours changes under the constraints 
given by a small, backward-looking structural model.  
The estimated coefficients of the rules are used to detect the main differences they imply in 
terms of labour market policy strategy. Once the rules are estimated, we study their 
performance by using two different analyses. 
The first relies on the historical behaviour of labour market authorities. A comparison 
between the actual and optimal policy rules gives rise to some important observations.  
First, for most countries the estimated rules suggest that the number of weekly hours was 
higher than needed in the early 1980s, while lower hours would have been advisable during 
the early 2000s. Second, the selected rules ably predict weekly hours’ behaviour during the 
early 1990s for the US but fail to do so for Germany. Another interesting observation that 
arises from the analysis is that in the US rather than in Germany the actual policy rule has 
come closer to the optimal rule since the mid-1990s.  
Another issue considered in the analysis is the ability of the rules to replicate historical 
weekly hours movements. The results emerging from the study stress that simple rules 
perform quite well in following workweek historical records. The ability to mimic working 
hours changes increases once an employment term is included in the reaction function. 
Moreover, considering a forward-looking dimension that takes into account expectations of 
future wage movements seems to give a further improvement. 
Finally, the study focuses on the efficiency of the estimated reaction functions. Our analysis 
suggests that the rule obtained by solving an optimal control algorithm is the top-performing 
rule. Nevertheless, the performance of a simple employment rule is almost as stabilizing as 
the optimal feedback rule. Thus, the gains obtained by policymakers in following a  28
complicated rule are not so high.  
Further conclusions arise from comparing the efficiency frontiers across the two countries. 
The outcome confirms the success of the US strategy in stabilizing employment and wages 
during the sample period. It also highlights the poor performance of the German models of 
labour market policy when following a wage rule. 
Based on these results we propose a policy rule to capture the dynamics of the weekly 
working hours. According to our rule the length of the workweek is an inverse function of the 
deviation between the actual and potential employment level. This conclusion is based on 
the belief that labour market variables are affected by movements in the business cycle.  29
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